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1 While journalism believes in a realist and positivist concept of language that no doubt
allows it to justify the impartiality of its coverage (Koren, 1996, 2004), this very concept
prevents  it  from perceiving the discursive tensions inherent in subjectification and
objectification.  These  philosophical  concepts  are  nevertheless  often  used  when
claiming to attribute, dilute, or even deny collective responsibility, with the purpose of
ensuring that  a  certain  point  of  view,  which would  normally  require  discussion,  is
taken for granted. It is this doubly complex notion of collective responsibility that we
want  to  examine  here,  within  the  framework  of  the  linguistics  of  discourse  which
attaches great importance to enunciative phenomena as well as to direct and indirect
forms of  argumentation (Amossy,  2006).  Such discourse,  the circulation of  which is
promoted by its enunciative effacement (Vion, 2001; Rabatel, 2002, 2004) or a claim by a
collective utterer, is the venue for important issues in the construction of a constantly
evolving ‘social mirror’ (Charaudeau, 1997, 2005; Moirand, 2000). As an extension of
issues 13, 17 and 22 of Semen (2000, 2004a, 2006), which focused on discourse analysis
and  were  respectively  dedicated  to  the  different  genres  of  written  press,
argumentation, and enunciative responsibility in the press, and in consonance with the
debates on media criticism, researcher ethics and constructivism that notably inspired
issues 4, 5 and 6 of Questions de communication (2003, 2004a, 2004b), this paper aims to
further explore and clarify some of the previous questions by focusing on an issue that
is problematic in a great many respects: collective responsibility.
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2 Collective responsibility is not the collective guilt of a group, but rather the way in
which an individual or a group takes into account the problems of a community that
aspires  to  ‘make  society’.  This  issue  emerges  at  very  different  rates  depending  on
societies and backgrounds. Newspaper articles or viewpoints published by the written
press clearly demonstrate that their authors foresee, desire, and theorise a return to
politics  and  changes  in  the  methods  of  participation  in  national  and  international
political  life.  The  increasing  importance  of  interdependencies  in  this  era  of
globalisation primarily raises questions concerning the written press, to which we will
confine our discussion. Indeed, the methods of the press paradoxically encourage the
depoliticisation of civil society, at a time when a return to politics would seem more
urgent and necessary than ever. To the extent that an ethical stance is reflected in
discourse,  it  is  logical  and  legitimate  that  linguistics  and  information  and
communication science realise this and integrate it into their field of application.
3 In their introduction to issue 22 of Semen,  Alain Rabatel and Andrée Chauvin-Vileno
(2006) discussed at length the complexity of the concept of responsibility, through its
genealogy in philosophy and in the legal sphere, and increased by its articulation with
regard to language issues. We intend to summarise the issues of this concept that are
relevant to this  paper.  But let  us  specify from the outset  that  this  question,  which
requires taking all necessary scientific precautions to be able to address it in a ‘learned’
way (Weber, 1919), and not as some kind of prophet of doom, does not exclude the fact
that  linguists  have  personal  convictions.  One  of  the  greatest  merits  of  Chaïm
Perelman’s work is his insistence on the fact that no intellectual activity, not even the
most speculative, is free from personal beliefs, even though these beliefs must always
be kept in check by the academic and/or scientific  requirements that govern them
(Koren, 2002, 2006). In this way, and contrary to popular belief, ethics of conviction and
ethics of responsibility should be complementary, which therefore implies a critical
review of Max Weber’s work (Rabatel, Chauvin-Vileno, 2006: 7).
 
From philosophical, legal and criminal responsibility to
political responsibility
Responsibility in philosophy
4 From  a  philosophical  point  of  view,  it  is  no  coincidence  that  the  concept  of
responsibility  in  the  modern  sense  of  the  term  appeared  during  the  Age  of
Enlightenment. Responsibility was considered to be at the heart of a dialectic between
subjects and an institution, the latter being strong only to the extent that its members
adhered to it, and ensuring their rights and duties in order to avoid the risk of anomie.
Responsibility emerged through a complex genealogy.  According to Jacques Henriot
(1990: 2250), responsibility goes hand in hand with the evolution of ideas and societies,
an extension of a quadruple process involving humanisation (responsibility restricted
to  human  beings,  as  opposed  to  the  responsibility  of  animals  or  the  ‘magical’
responsibility  of  things),  individualisation  (as  opposed  to  collective  responsibility),
internalisation (consciousness, free will), and civilisation (the emergence of civil
liability,  on  the  basis  of  primitive  criminal  liability).  This  cavalier  perspective
establishes  the  concept  of  collective  responsibility  in  reference  to  an  archaic
background of community violence that persists, but without becoming a value, and
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not  only  in  the  Western  world.  The  philosophical  concept  of  responsibility  claims
universality (ethical responsibility is valid at all times and in all places), just like the
universality of the human figure, but which is negated by the specifics of legal theories
and systems. However, collective responsibility should not be restricted to some kind of
attachment to the past,  given that it  also calls for collective actions supporting the
development of  institutions that  provide a  concrete expression of  this  universality,
echoing that of the human figure (see below).
 
Civil and criminal liability
5 In  legal  terms,  civil  liability  requires  a  person to  make compensation for  injury or
damage caused to others, whereas criminal liability involves the person convicted of an
offence under the law being sentenced and punished by the competent courts. This
criminal liability, which owes much to Immanuel Kant’s analysis of culpability, implies
an adult individual, who is rational, self-possessed, conscious of the consequences of
his/her actions, capable of discerning right from wrong, and endowed with free will
and  with  volitional  and  cognitive  abilities.  While  theological,  political  or  scientific
issues  related  to  this  background  (sin,  alienation,  or  biological  or  psychological
determinism)  tend  to  undermine  the  foundations  of  responsibility  or  liability,  the
majority of critics of free will do not go so far as to question the concepts of choice,
deliberation and rational action on the part of the individual (Fischer, 1996: 847). At
most, they sustain the idea that the human justice system is flawed, that the act of
judging  is  complex  because  human  beings  are  incommensurable,  and  that,
consequently, it is essential to take into account the history of the subjects and the
weight of the circumstances in order to establish the facts (Danblon, 2002).
6 But  increasing  interdependencies  have  altered  the  purely  individual  approach  to
responsibility1.  This happened in France, first with the emergence of the concept of
moral  responsibility  (outside  that  of  the  State),  followed  by  the  administrative
responsibility of the State, which received growing recognition during the second half
of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  distinguished  between  administrative  blame,  which
cannot be individualised, and the culpability or fault of a state employee in the exercise
of his/her duties. This extension met with great resistance on the part of the State, heir
to the old maxim ‘the King can do no wrong’. It also raised questions concerning the
appropriateness of an extension likely to lead to a result that was the precise opposite
of the desired effect, by diluting responsibilities to an extreme within a framework of
overall indeterminate responsibility. This also explains why both moral responsibility
and administrative responsibility can be cumulated with personal fault (Le Pors, 1999:
37-40).
 
Towards a political and social concept of collective responsibility
7 It is significant that the concept of collective responsibility has been alleged in court to
mitigate the responsibility of individuals, on the pretext that a ‘chain of responsibility’
exists, a ‘system’, even, in which personal responsibility is non-existent, the individual
being a mere ‘cog’. Such arguments are null and void in legal terms. Indeed, the role of
the law is to recognise individuals and individual responsibilities inserted within the
tight framework of other individual responsibilities (the sum of which is not equal to
collective  responsibility).  This  is  notably  the  case  with  medical  malpractice,
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occupational  diseases  and  accidents,  and  allegations  of  corruption,  where  doctors,
businessmen,  government  officials  or  policy  makers  hide  behind  collective
responsibility or their role as ‘underlings’2 (see, for example, Fleury, Walter, 2005, on
the Papon v. France case). One of the most significant textbook cases is that of Adolf
Eichmann,  both by  the  magnitude  of  the  crime and the  arguments  put  forward to
reduce  his  personal  responsibility,  and  by  Hannah  Arendt’s  comments  on  his  trial
(1964). The following example is prototypical with regard to each of these factors, and
it will be easily understood why we devote so much space to it.
“Morally  speaking,  it  is  as  wrong  to  feel  guilty  without  having  done  anything
specific as it is to feel free of all guilt if one actually is guilty of something. I have
always regarded it as the quintessence of moral confusion that during the post-war
period in Germany those who personally were completely innocent assured each
other and the world at large how guilty they felt, while very few of the criminals
were prepared to admit even the slightest remorse. The result of this spontaneous
admission of  collective guilt  was of  course a  very effective,  though unintended,
whitewash of those who had done something: as we have already seen, where all are
guilty, no one is. [...] Well, if young people in Germany, too young to have done
anything at all,  feel guilty,  they are either wrong, confused,  or they are playing
intellectual games. There is no such thing as collective guilt or collective innocence;
guilt and innocence make sense only if applied to individuals.
Recently, during the discussion of the Eichmann trial, these comparatively simple
matters  have been complicated through what  I’ll  call  the  cog theory.  When we
describe  a  political  system  –  how  it  works,  the  relations  between  the  various
branches of government, how the huge bureaucratic machineries function of which
the channels of command are part, and how the civilian and the military and the
police forces are interconnected, to mention only outstanding characteristics – it is
inevitable that we speak of all persons used by the system in terms of cogs and
wheels that keep the administration running. Each cog, that is, each person, must
be  expendable  without  changing  the  system,  an  assumption  underlying  all
bureaucracies, all civil services, and all functions properly speaking. This viewpoint
is the viewpoint of political science, and if we accuse or rather evaluate in its frame
of reference, we speak of good and bad systems and our criteria are the freedom or
the happiness or the degree of participation of the citizens, but the question of the
personal responsibility of those who run the whole affair is a marginal issue. Here it
is  indeed  true  what  all  the  defendants  in  the  post-war  trials  said  to  excuse
themselves: if I had not done it, somebody else could and would have. [...]
When I went to Jerusalem to attend the Eichmann trial, I felt that it was the great
advantage of courtroom procedure that this whole cog-business makes no sense in
its setting, and therefore forces us to look at all these questions from a different
point of view. To be sure, that the defence would try to plead that Eichmann was
but a small cog was predictable; that the defendant himself would think in these
terms was probable [...]. The judges did what was right and proper, they discarded
the whole notion [...]. For, as the judges took great pains to point out explicitly, in a
courtroom there is no system on trial, no History or historical trend, no ism, anti-
Semitism  for  instance,  but  a  person,  and  if  the  defendant  happens  to  be  a
functionary, he stands accused precisely because even a functionary is still a human
being, and it is in this capacity that he stands trial.  Obviously, in most criminal
organisations the small cogs are actually committing the big crimes, and one could
even argue that one of the characteristics of the organised criminality of the Third
Reich  was  that  it  demanded  tangible  proof  of  criminal  implication  of  all  its
servants, and not only of the lower echelons. Hence, the question addressed by the
court to the defendant is, Did you, such and such, an individual with a name, a date,
and place of birth, identifiable and by that token not expendable, commit the crime
you stand accused of, and Why did you do it? If the defendant answers: “It was not I
as a person who did it, I had neither the will nor the power to do anything out of my
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own initiative; I was a mere cog, expendable, everybody in my place would have
done it; that I stand before this tribunal is an accident” – this answer will be ruled
out as immaterial. [...] For to the answer: “Not I but the system did it in which I was
a cog,” the court immediately raises the next question: “And why, if you please, did
you become a cog or continue to be a cog under such circumstances?” If the accused
wishes to shift  responsibilities,  he must  again implicate other persons,  he must
name names, and these persons appear then as possible codefendants, they do not
appear as the embodiment of bureaucratic or any other necessity.” (Arendt, 1964:
59-63)
8 While the notion of collective responsibility is irrelevant in both legal and moral terms,
it makes perfect sense on a political level3. Its purpose is not so much to stigmatise a
whole community as to question the role of everyone as individuals within a collective
undertaking.  This  role  cannot  be  reduced  to  nothing,  nor  can  it  be  assumed
indefinitely.  Collective  responsibility  is  our  responsibility  as  members  of  a  specific
community. It is therefore inalienable (unless we leave the community), but under no
circumstances  does  it  make  us  guilty  of  actions  we  have  not  committed.  As  Gilles
Deleuze (1991: 103) put it, we are not responsible for the victims, but to the victims.
From a political point of view, the notion of collective responsibility primarily concerns
the individual, when he/she feels responsible for the state of affairs in the world, by
extending his/her sphere(s) of belonging. Claiming to be a ‘citizen of the world’ (one of
the aspirations of the philosophy of the Enlightenment) is a constitutive aspiration of
the concept of collective responsibility. Historically, this aspiration has been embodied
in multiple roles: as a prophet, a sage, an Enlightenment philosopher, a scientist who
places  his/her knowledge as  an expert  at  the service of  society,  an intellectual,  an
official,  a  spokesperson,  a  politician,  etc.  But  the  representation  of  collective
responsibility is not only embodied in prominent figures. An activist or a citizen who
seeks to reconcile his/her actions and discourse, in his/her daily life4, can thus claim to
embody a part of collective responsibility within the framework of activities that have
repercussions  on  the  solving  of  the  world’s  problems,  and  that  wish  to  contribute
effectively to their resolution5.
9 But the situation is  changing with increasing interdependency and the exponential
growth in mankind’s power of intervention in the twenty-first century, able now to
influence  the  fate  of  future  generations,  or  even  the  entire  human  race  (genetic
manipulation,  for  example).  This  being  the  case,  we  can  only  agree  with  the  view
expressed by Hans Jonas (1979: 31): 
10 “The Antigone chorus on the deinotes, the wondrous power, of man would have to read
differently now; and its admonition to the individual to honour the laws of the land
would no longer be enough. The gods,  too, whose venerable rights could check the
headlong rush of human action, are long gone. To be sure, the old prescriptions of the
‘neighbour’ ethics – of justice, charity, honesty, and so on – still hold in their intimate
immediacy for the nearest, day-by-day sphere of human interaction. But this sphere is
overshadowed by a growing realm of collective action where doer, deed and effect are
no longer the same as they were in the proximate sphere, and which by the enormity of
its  powers  forces  upon ethics  a  new dimension of  responsibility  never  dreamed of
before.”
11 This  is  why  collective  responsibility  today  also  includes,  in  its  organisational  or
institutional aspects: the rise of globalisation (both on the economic and media fronts),
the  growing  number  of  economic  and  cultural  exchanges,  the  intermingling  of
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populations, the increasing number of cross-border ecological crises, and the similarity
of problems in a great many countries. All of these factors have helped create the idea
of  finding  global  solutions  to  global  problems,  without  doing  away  with  actual
specificities  or  strong  disparities  for  all that.  The  increase  in  the  number  of
supranational institutions (in times of difficulty), the creation of organisations such as
the International Court of Justice in The Hague, the signing of the Kyoto Protocol, and
the growing numbers of international meetings (political summits) are indications of
the  rise  of  this  still  faltering  sense  of  collective  responsibility,  as evidenced  by
expressions  such  as  ‘international  politics’,  ‘global  regulation’,  ‘good  governance’,
‘global civil society’, and so on. This feeling, the expression of which generates many
difficulties at institutional level, is also conveyed by intermediate bodies, by certain
corporations that  are aware of  the limits  of  the corporatist  approach,  and by non-
governmental organisations. Thus, traces of this concept can be found at all levels of
society, at more or less advanced stages.
12 However, this emergence is fraught with contradictory tensions. Sometimes the feeling
of generalised powerlessness and complexity dilutes the sense of responsibility, while
at  other  times  the  political  deficit  encourages  resorting  to  scapegoats  or  the
increasingly litigious nature of social relations. The fair consideration of the interests
of  future  generations  –  a  characteristic  inherent  in  the  concept  of  collective
responsibility (see Weber, 1919; Arendt, 1964) – has led some, such as Hans Jonas (1979),
to put forward a ‘heuristic of fear’ leading to a precautionary principle, established as a
system  and  hindering  the  risk-taking  inherent  in  innovation.  Just  criticism  of  the
shortcomings  of  democratic  institutions  can  serve  to  undermine  these  very
organisations and result in reasserting the value of governance by ‘experts’ or ‘wise
persons’6. This is why collective responsibility attaches great importance to the concept
of citizenship in a dialectic that does not preclude universes that are impervious to
each other:  the public  sphere v.  the private sphere,  the political  world v.  the legal
world,  the  responsible  elite  v.  the  irresponsible  citizens  (or  vice  versa).  Rather,
collective responsibility seeks to work towards making room for rationality, which is
not  restricted to  vericonditional  rationality  but  rather  seeks  axiological  rationality,
compatible with the requirements of the action. It is in relation to this issue of ‘civic
education’ that we attempt to understand the concept of collective responsibility (see
below).
 
Collective responsibility in the media: the
construction, spread and denial of a concept
13 Our project continues the discussion on the issue of responsibility in linguistics and
information  and  communication  science  (Rabatel,  Chauvin-Vileno,  2006)  by
questioning how the media  portrays  collective  responsibility,  as  well  as  changes  in
individual responsibility as viewed through the prism of collective responsibility, given
that  the  one  does  not  negate  the  other.  But  it  is  important  to  first  clarify  the
relationship  between  this  responsibility  and  the  concept  of  responsibility  or
commitment  in  linguistics,  before  identifying  possible  main  lines  of  analysis of
collective responsibility,  and then profiling the latter from the point of view of the
ethics of public discourse.
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Commitment, involvement, and personal and collective
responsibility
14 While the concept of responsibility per se is absent from linguistics dictionaries, it is
nevertheless implied where the notion of  utterer is  concerned,  defined as one who
takes  responsibility  for  his/her  utterances  (Rabatel  2008).  This  responsibility,  or
commitment, results from conversational maxims, notably the principle of sincerity:
one is supposed to fully assume the opinions one asserts (if only by default) as primary
speaker/utterer, even in the absence of specifically expressed approval or agreement,
unlike non-commitment (conditional, epistemic disjuncts, reported discourse, framing,
etc.).
15 Commitment does not correspond to either involvement or disinvolvement, if by that
we mean the choice of a specific utterance level7: non-implication (non-involvement)
on the part of the speaker/utterer when referencing objects of discourse in no way
diminishes his/her responsibility.  The same is true for the illocutionary force of an
utterance. Indeed, the greater the illocutionary force, the more the speaker invests in
his/her  utterance,  but  a  low  degree  of  illocutionary  force  does  not  lead  to  non-
commitment  of  the  vericonditional  value  of  the  utterance  by  the  speaker/utterer.
Similarly an utterance does not require implication on the part of the speaker to be
true, or judged as true, just as its argumentative (rational) value is independent of the
commitment of the speaker/utterer, unlike its persuasive value. The referential truth
criterion is fundamental in terms of commitment, as is the axiological commitment
criterion, which would merit accurate analysis on the basis of the above set of criteria
(see footnote 4 above; Koren, 2007).
16 This  line  of  questioning  examines,  in  particular,  the  expression  of  collective
responsibility in the media. Indeed, journalists – like other speakers to a certain extent,
but perhaps more than most given the public nature of their discourse – are exposed to
the expression of circulating terms or points of view that they take up and continue,
without always being able to distance themselves from them. This is notably true for
terms  or  analytical  frameworks  that  encourage  naturalised  representations  of  the
world  in  which  enunciative  effacement  reigns  supreme,  even  though  it  may  rub
shoulders with many axiological arguments. In this case, does not the fact of repeating
these  views  without  distancing  oneself  from  them  (in  the  name  of  objectivity)
contribute, albeit indirectly, to the renewal of other ways of seeing and thinking that
would also merit discussion? It is significant to note that while journalists readily speak
of the ethics involved in naming their sources, they are not so willing to discuss the
views underlying the use of certain vocabulary, or portraying certain representations
of  the  social  scene  (Rabatel,  2006).  And  it  is  no  doubt  also  fair  to  say  that  the
responsibility of the media can be called into question when, unlike the ‘metalinguistic
silence’ mentioned above, it conveys subjective points of view via a certain number of
genres (editorials, analyses, reviews, etc.) that tear down some and build up others,
fluctuating  between  non-intervention  on  the  one  hand  and,  at  the  other  extreme,
inciting outright rejection, the implicit legitimisation of hate, and so on.
17 For  all  of  these  reasons,  the  concept  of  responsibility  (accountability)  needs  to  be
questioned within the framework of the press, given that the latter represents a venue
for  public  debate.  In  this  respect,  we  adhere  to   Emmanuel  Levinas’s  philosophy  of
personal ethical responsibility to others (Calin, Sebbah, 2002).
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Textual locations of the emergence of collective responsibility
18 From a linguistic point of view, collective responsibility can be analysed in terms of
discourse in the following ways:
Distinguishing between speakers/utterers, elites, officials, professionals (from the media),
activists and ordinary citizens who explicitly position themselves as sharing this collective
responsibility and discourse on this basis.
Taking into account the influence of the specificity of topics and fields in the discursive use
of  collective  responsibility,  where  collective  responsibility  for  political,  economic,
environmental, health, safety, cultural, ideological or religious issues are not treated in the
same way within their corresponding fields.
Analysing  the  modalities  of  restitution  of  such  discourse,  or  even  how  it  is  solicited,
reported and staged by the media in national and regional daily newspapers, depending on
the authors, themes, periods and genres.
19 This paper therefore analyses some of the locations that discursively produce collective
responsibility, as well as those that journalistic discourse tries to ignore:
Metadiscourse  on  collective  responsibility:  implicit  or  explicit  designations  (synonyms,
antonyms,  etc.),  lexicalised  or  not;  locations  where  the  emergence  of  the  concept  is
particularly highlighted, isotopies, names of the agents, stages in accountability.
Explicit signs (in the dictum and/or the modus) of commitment to the concept of collective
responsibility, by clear attribution of responsibilities to a group or by a claim of collective
responsibility assumed by the speaker/utterer through formulas that indicate a coincidence
between words and things (Authier-Revuz, 1995), such as ‘X is the right word; I dare say X;
that which is called X; X; I mean X’, where naming is a committed act of demystification,
challenging established doxa.
Explicit signs of distancing through modality and forms of non-coincidence (‘X, if you can
call it X; X, if we can speak of X’) which, by the systematisation of semantic fuzziness and a
sort of argument of powerlessness (deliberate or not) to ‘say things how they are’, serve to
cloud what is actually said, encouraging a dilution of the concept of collective responsibility
and therefore putting off until later any attribution of collective responsibility.
Discursive practices that encourage taking a problematic reality for granted: enunciative
effacement  (Vion,  2001;  Rabatel  2005);  objectifying  discourse  (Koren,  1996);  stereotypy
(Amossy, Herschberg-Pierrot, 1997); testimonies, reporting of facts (Velcic-Canivez, 2006);
perceptual  evidence  (Rabatel,  2005a);  prediscourse  (Paveau,  2006);  effects  of  circulating
discourse,  constantly  rehashed by  a  large  number  of  media  regardless  of  their  political
options (Moirand, Rosier8); discussions on a certain form of default collective responsibility
in which evidence plays a significant role in the circulation of discourse, the construction of
social  identities  and  ideologies,  and  the  imposition  of  truth  (pensée  unique,  wooden
language).
Alongside these textual and discursive locations of the emergence of the concept, we will
also attempt to analyse the effects  of  confusion,  of  ‘slip-ups’  in  discourse attributing or
refuting the concept of collective responsibility through the naturalisation of powerlessness,
the  unilateral  attribution  of  responsibilities  to  a  single  source,  concealment,  and  the
metalinguistic  silence  concerning  the  identity  of  those  to  whom  we  attribute  blame9.
Problematising, challenging and debating, or complicating ethical issues is not an attempt to
‘dilute’ responsibility, but rather to assume responsibilities within a system of checks and
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Towards an ethics of public discourse
20 This  work  is  not  without  risk  –  the  moralistic  posture  of  the  noble-minded,
traditionalism, attachment to the past and to aristocratism (see Taguieff, 2007: 78-9) –
for which we assume full responsibility. In the continuity of the cumulative logic that
should be at the heart of linguistics, it seems to us that previous work challenging the
uniqueness of the speaker and dealing with enunciative effacement, to which we have
contributed, would today require further research on the issues of ethics, responsibility
and accountability, and hierarchical organisation. At least two sets of reasons can be
invoked here. On the one hand, internal developments in the field of linguistics, which,
without  rejecting  the  achievements  of  structuralism,  integrate  into  the  analysis  of
language interactional and ethical concerns (see Dominicy, Frédéric, 2001; Masseron,
2003) that, far from being confined to literary texts, are fundamental to the study of
communicative  action.  On  the  other  hand,  developments  external  to  the  field  of
linguistics, but which nevertheless interact with it. The proliferation of discourse is a
given: media specialists measure it every day, and with it, the difficulty of managing
multiple sources, to the point that everything seems to be of equal merit. But while it is
unrealistic  to  return  to  the  time  of  licensed  distributors  of  official  discourse  or
authorised knowledge, it  nevertheless seems vital  to question by what principles of
regulation  and  hierarchy  different  knowledge  can  be  built  together,  reasoning
developed,  and values  defined through confrontation within a place that allows for
making society10. In this sense, what follows would aim to contribute to an ethics of
public discourse, these ‘emerging issues’,  to borrow and modify Caroline Masseron’s
expression (2003: 3), that we believe it is urgent to expand.
21 The  articles  focus  on  descriptive  studies  and/or  theoretical  issues.  The  corpora  of
journalistic texts (case studies, longitudinal and quantitative studies) should explore
issues of collective responsibility from one or more points of view. We sincerely hope
that this work will be carried out based on ethical requirements far removed from any
judgemental aim, and with a desire to find ways and means of public expression that
allow for dealing with the complex and with conflicts in a sometimes harsh way, but
always preferring rhetorical weapons over any and all bellicose policies.
 
Cross-disciplinary contributions
22 The composition of this paper reflects the fact that discourse analysis is deliberately
situated  today  at  the  crossroads  of  linguistics,  humanities  and  social  sciences.  The
authors are linguists, discourse analysts (Alain Rabatel, Roselyne Koren), researchers in
information and communication science, and sociologists (Jean-Francois Tétu, Gilles
Bastin). Moreover, two of them include an argumentative component in their discourse
analysis (Ruth Amossy, Roselyne Koren). This does not mean that they have decided to
abandon the epistemological  differences between them, but rather that  all  of  them
have  taken  into  consideration  approaches  by  disciplines  other  than  their  own,
readjusting concepts borrowed from these disciplines in order to integrate them into
their arguments. For all of the authors, however, whether sociologists or discourse and
utterance  analysts,  the  priority  is  the  need to  contribute,  on the  one hand,  to  the
conceptualisation of collective responsibility and, on the other hand, to the anchoring
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of this  conceptualisation within the textual  framework of  French and foreign press
articles.
23 Roselyne  Koren  explores  media  or  mediatised  metadiscourse,  as  seen  through  the
prism  of  the  definitions  of  the  concept  given  by  Hannah  Arendt  and  Max  Weber.
Current  manifestations  of  the  concept  confirm  in  a  very  striking  way  the
conceptualisation  proposed  by  these  two  thinkers.  The  emergence  of  a  sense  of
responsibility stems from a crisis situation. Politicians, citizens and civil societies are
confronted with very real dilemmas in the face of which they must adopt an attitude of
‘realism’. The option of doing nothing is obviously open to them, but they prefer to
decide  and  act,  even  against  their  own  convictions  if  necessary.  Collective
responsibility implies that citizens seek to reconcile ethics of conviction and ethics of
responsibility. The metadiscourse of the corpus examined combines individual moral
responsibility and collective political responsibility, made  inevitable by globalisation. It
dissociates  guilt  and  responsibility,  responsibility  and  powerlessness  or  the  fear  of
acting  and  thinking  against  the  injunctions  of  doxa,  state  responsibility  and  the
responsibility of civil societies, the duty of objectivity on the part of the media and the
duty to tell, understood as an exercise of a revisited critical function.
24 Alain Rabatel anchors his discussion in the discursive and enunciative realities of a
debate between Socialist party candidates in the 2007 French presidential pre-election
campaign. The goal of his contribution is to move from a simple analysis of an example
considered emblematic, to more general considerations. The article problematises the
issue of the failure, due to renouncement, to give an argued form to conflicts in the
public arena, when ideally the role of mediator should involve the presentation and
problematisation of the views of different sections of society, before society as a whole.
And yet, the choice of questions retained for the above-mentioned debate was neither
explained nor justified. The same was true as regards the omission of key issues. The
ethical ‘ritual’ implied in the duty of ‘objectivity’ thus fell well short of the expectations
authorised  by  an  ethical  concept  of  information.  Putting  into  words  and
conceptualisation are therefore explored through the prism of the political, social and
ethical issues that underlie the linguistic construction of the verb ‘to answer’, i.e., ‘to
answer for’, ‘to answer to’, etc.
25 Jean-François Tétu calls for a redefinition of the journalistic identity within a context of
crisis in journalism and representation. The study of public journalism in the United
States  allows  him  to  problematise  the  issue  of  the  transformation  of  journalistic
responsibility, hitherto considered as individual, into collective responsibility. Moving
from the right of information to the right to information plays a decisive role here.
Public  journalism  abandons  the  exercise  of  a  critical  function  and  the  analysis  of
conflictual  situations.  Rather,  it  prefers  to  listen to  readers  and gives  priority  to  a
unique form of thought, close to communitarianism. It therefore reinforces the myth of
direct democracy, and obliges journalists to redefine the nature and legitimacy of their
profession. And while public or civic journalism has never really reached the major
newspapers or the major television networks, it has, according to Tétu, represented the
starting  point  for  two  very  recent  and  widespread  phenomena:  blogs,  or  citizens
portals, and partnership agreements between large information institutions and civic
portals.  The conceptualisation of the social  or collective responsibility of the media
therefore invites the reader to reflect on the virtues and vices of another concept for
which there is currently little consensus: the democracy of opinion.
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26 Gilles Bastin suggests a sociological and discursive examination of articles published in
the early 2000s on the subject of the Outreau trial in France, a textbook case. According
to  Bastin,  it  is  important  to  highlight  and  analyse  a  paradox:  the  asymmetry  that
opposed  the  logic  of  the  anonymisation  of  the  journalistic  word,  i.e.,  the
systematisation  of  enunciative  effacement  and  of  the  effects  of  objectivity  in  the
reports on the judicial inquiry, on the one hand, and, on the other, the way these same
articles  expressly  named  the  suspects  and  demanded  that  they  account  for  their
actions.  In  this  case,  therefore,  the  press  assumed  the  ‘exceptional’  privilege  of
‘irresponsibility’ precisely where we would have expected it to ‘answer to’ or ‘answer
for’... Two discursive strategies strongly contribute to this attitude. Firstly, the generic
term of  ‘the media’  that  neutralises  attribution to the individual  and therefore the
obligation to take individual  moral  responsibility for what is  written.  Secondly,  the
metaphor of the ‘enthusiasm’ that complacently sustains the myth that facts have a life
of their own, reflected by mirror writing on the part of anonymous mediators who
distance themselves from what they write.
27 Ruth Amossy addresses the issue of the collective responsibility of the written press on
the basis of a corpus made up of editorials published in the Israeli newspaper Ha-aretz
during  the  2006  Lebanon  War.  These  editorials  problematise  the  issue  of  the
conclusions of the Winograd Commission, a commission of inquiry into the role of the
government and the army during the war. The members of the Commission claimed
that they did not want to decide or to vote for or against the resignation of the political
and military officials involved. The question of the respective responsibilities of the
press,  political  bodies  and  the  Commission  is  examined  via  a  concept  of  discourse
analysis  that  incorporates  an argumentative component.  This  allows us  to  begin to
understand how a democratic media body works, within a context of crisis, to solve
tension  between  conflicting  ethical  obligations:  respecting  the  decisions  of  a
democratically  elected  government,  but  also  fulfilling  the  role  of  a  critical
counterbalance, specific to the political press, and positioning itself against another
body, every bit as legitimate as the government (the Winograd Commission). Reported
speech and syllogistic construction are scientific concepts that seem far removed from
the passions underlying this controversy. Nevertheless, these concepts make it possible
to describe, shed light on and problematise the discursive and argumentative practices
of journalists who wish to assume personal responsibility within the scope of an ethics
of democratic discourse, without exhausting the question of collective responsibility.
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NOTES
1. In legal terms, notably, the concept of responsibility or liability draws not only on the concept
of fault, but also on that of liability without fault, or strict liability, which is compassionate in
nature, and which is at the centre of the concept of compensation for damage (see Ewald, 1997;
Engel, 1997: 80-82).
2. It is interesting to note that, according to Jean-Pierre Cléro and Christian Laval (2002: 806 et
seq.), Jeremy Bentham was one of the first to broach the subject of the individual responsibility of
persons holding public office. Bentham even tried to accentuate this individual responsibility,
because,  from  his  utilitarian  perspective,  the  refusal  to  dilute  responsibility  met  the
requirements for maximum efficiency. At first view, this approach was rather unexpected for a
theory  that  preferred to  emphasize  the  flaws  in  official  structures  rather  than the  faults  of
individuals, but it was precisely because of the inertia of these structures that Bentham called for
a strengthening of individual responsibility.
3. It  is  a case here of general political  responsibility,  not the individual responsibility of the
politicians (Le Pors, 1999: 41-44).
4. For example, as a law-abiding driver, a user who makes decisions in the interest of the public
good, or an environmentally-responsible consumer. In this sense, whenever individual behaviour
is justified by concern for others at any level whatsoever, collective responsibility is built. Of
course,  the  consequences  of  this  practical  exercise  in  collective  responsibility  (assumed  or
denied) are not the same depending on the role of the individuals concerned, but this should not
constitute  a  reason  for  doing  away  with  reflection  on  this  particular  type  of  collective
responsibility.
5. According to Hannah Arendt (1968: 183), no individual and personal moral standard of conduct
can excuse us from collective responsibility. For her, this delegated responsibility for things we
have not done, in other words, the way we take responsibility for the consequences of things for
which we are completely innocent, is the price we have to pay both in order to live our lives
among our fellow human beings, and so that the ability to act, that political right par excellence,
can be expressed in one of the many and varied forms of human community.
6. These contradictions are what led Philippe Corcuff (1997: 385-387) to both agree and disagree
with Hans Jonas, and to maintain the relevance of Ernst Bloch’s ‘principle of hope’, i.e., utopia,
even though it meant suggesting a less messianic approach than those proposed by Bloch and,
especially, Karl Marx (refer also to the analysis by Étienne Balibar, 1997).
7. This issue must be distinguished from all other forms of explicit expression of the exercise,
refusal, denial, or even impossibility of collective responsibility.
8. See the article by Jean-Claude Guillebaud (Nouvel Observateur,  5-11/04/90, pp. 46-48) on the
subject of the Romanian Revolution in Timisoara, ‘Cinq jours de dérapage médiatique analysés
heure par heure. Roumanie : qui a menti ? [italics ours]’. While the article describes this revolution
as a ‘textbook case’, the very rhetoric of putting it into words takes on the qualities of a perfect
example of enunciative effacement, naturalisation, and discursive and argumentative strategies
to sidestep the act of explicitly assuming responsibility.
9. This issue could be addressed with regard to corpora of journalistic texts dedicated to the
coverage and analysis of different types of crises (political, military, economic, environmental,
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etc.).  In  this  case,  the  issue  of  collective  responsibility  makes  sense  in  the  area  of  politics,
understood as an area of deliberation and democratic resistance to totalitarianism. On a thematic
level,  this  issue  refers  specifically  to  multiple  strategies  to  incite  collective  hatred,  or  to
strategies of blaming some in order to better exonerate others (refer to the various discussions
on colonialism, the slave trade, etc.).
10. This is one of the reasons that motivated the theme of issue 35 of Lidil devoted to the growing
complexity  of  the  author  figure  and  the  ensuing  difficulties  for  the  learner  facing  a  non-
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